Abstract. A complete determination is made of the possible values for £(sup X" ) and supfEA',: t a stop rule} for Xx, X2,... independent uniformly bounded random variables; this yields results of Krengel, Sucheston, and Garling, and of Hill and Kertz as easy corollaries.
Introduction. Following the initial discoveries by Krengel and Sucheston
of surprising universal constants in the theory of optimal stopping, further comparisons have been made [1, 3, 4, 5, 8 ] between 7T(sup X"), "the expected gain of a prophet or player with complete foresight", and sup{EXt: t a stop rule}, "the expected gain of a player using nonanticipating stop rules".
In §2, a complete determination is made (Theorem 2.3) of the possible values for sup EX, and £ (sup X" ) in the case of uniformly bounded independent random variables.
In §3 it is shown (Theorem 3.11) that in an optimal stopping problem (with independent random variables) in which the player is free to select the order of observation of the variables, he may do just as well with a prespecified fixed ordering as with order selections depending on past outcomes.
In §4 a complete determination is made (Theorem 4.1) of the advantage a player may obtain by rearranging, even as a function of past outcomes, the order of observation of a given sequence. Définition 2.1. A function /: R00 -> N is a (measurable) stopping function if t~\n) E B°° for all n, and if t(x\, x'2,...) = n whenever t(xx, x2,...) -n and x'¡ = x,; for all /' = 1,2,... ,n. ST is the set of all stopping functions, and ?>" the set of all stopping functions which stop no later than n, i.e. GS" -{t E 9": t < « everywhere}. For í e 5", A',: ß -» R is the function defined by Xt(u>) -X"(u) for all w with *(*,(«), A2(w),...) = «.
For the remainder of this section, one may think of 9" and 3"B as the classically defined sets of stop rules for (Xx, X2,...) and (A^,.. .,A") respectively; in all subsequent results in this section the definitions coincide. The main reason for the approach of Definition 2.1 is that § §3 and 4 will consider situations where a player is allowed to select the order of observations of the {X¡), and stop whenever he pleases, whereas the classical definition of stop rule is dependent on one given ordering of the random variables. Moreover, as remarked in [6] , this present approach seems more natural in the sense that actual implementation of stop rules invariably involves only sets of real values with which the player is content to stop, not observation of the underlying subsets of ß. Proof. To see that every point in 5 is a possible value (v, u) (for some A-,, X2,...), fix (x, y) in S, let a = (y -x)/(x -x2), and define A,, X2,... by: A", = x; X2 = 1 with probability ax, and = 0 otherwise; and X" = 0 for n > 2. Then it is easy to check that v = sup{7iA,: t E ?T} = x (since 0 < a < 1), and that u = E (sup X") = ax + x -ax2 = y.
Nearly all the work for the converse is found in the proof of Theorem A in [4] . Fix A,, X2,... independent and uniformly bounded in [0,1], and check (as in [4] ) that u-v = E(sup" X") -sup{EX,: t E 5"} < E(max{Yx, Y2}) -sup{£T,: t E %}, where: Yx = v; and Y2 = 1 with probability v, and = 0 otherwise. Since sup{£T,: t E %) = v and E(max{Yx, Y2}) = 2v -v2, this implies u < 2v -v2; the inequality v =£ u is immediate from the definitions. 3. Order selection in optimal stopping problems. 9" will denote the set of all permutations of {1,2,...,«} and 9 the permutations of N. For tr E 9, ir[j] will denote the image of j under the mapping tr: N -* N. Without ambiguity, 9 and 9" will be viewed as the subsets of 9v and 9(" representing constant order selectors. Then it is easy to see from the definitions that 92 = 92, but that 9" is a proper subset of 9" for all n > 2.
Next is an example of a simple nonconstant order selector. Thus the worth of a sequence is the most a player can expect to gain if he is free to select the order of observation of the random variables depending on past outcomes, and free to stop whenever he pleases.
The next theorem, the main result of this section, says that a player free to select the order of observation in an optimal stopping problem with independent random variables may do just as well using order selections which do not depend on past observations, as with ones which do. Theorem 3.11. W({XX, A"2,...}) = sup{F(A;): tr e9).
Proof. Clearly it is enough to show that for all « E N, (6) W({Xx,...,X")) = max{V(XT):-nE9").
The proof of (6) will use both forward and backward induction; forward induction on n and backward induction within steps for fixed n. Clearly (6) is true for n = 1 (and even n -2, since 92 = 9,2). Assume it is true for k = 1,...,«-1, and fix r E 9,". Without loss of generality (otherwise reindex the {A^}) it may be assumed that (7) r[l] = 1 and V(X2,X3,...,X") = max{v(X" [2] ,...,X"["]):*E9",TT[l] = l}.
Since 9" C 9,n, to prove (6) it is enough to show that where the first equality in (10) follows from (9) and Lemma 3.8; the first inequality from (7) and the induction hypothesis; the second inequality since (by backward induction again) it is optimal to stop at time 1 if and only if A, > V(X2,...,X"); and the last equality by Lemma 3.5. This completes the proof. D As the next example illustrates, the conclusion of Theorem 3.11 may fail without the assumption of independence, even for three random variables. To see that every point in 5 is a possible pair (v, w) for some Xx, X2,..., fix A",, A2,... as in the proof of Theorem 2.3, and note that W({XX, X2,...)) = V(X2,Xx,X3,XA,...) = E(sup"X"). U The corollaries analogous to (1) and (2) Moreover, it is clear that the bounds "2" in (11) and "¿>/4" in (12) are best possible.
As in [3,4,5,7, and 8] , probabilistic interpretations may be given to the results (11) and (12): (11) says that in an optimal stopping problem with independent nonnegative random variables, a player should never pay more than v (= sup{EXt: t E 9"}) for the privilege of rearranging the order of observation, even if allowed to do so sequentially depending on previous outcomes; and (12) says that in the uniformly bounded case, he should never pay more than \ for the privilege of rearranging the order of observation.
The next example, a slight variation of an example in the proof of [3, Proposition 1], shows that (11) may fail without the assumption of independence, even if the sequence of random variables is both Markov and a martingale. Similarly, (12) may fail without independence, even if the sequence is again both Markov and a martingale, as is seen easily from [3, Example 4.2] .
If the random variables are uniformly bounded in [a, a + b], the set S in Theorem 4.1 must again be replaced by the set S' in (3).
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